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Reasonable Suspicion that the Holding in United 
States v. Lewis Was Incorrect 
NICHOLAS SGROI 
In late January 2021, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit decided United States v. Lewis in which they affirmed the district court’s 
denial of a motion to suppress evidence.1 The court found that the stop and 
search was proper under Fourth Amendment case law, and more specifically, 
justified as a Terry stop.2 But given the facts of the case, the reasonable 
suspicion requirement needed for such stops is unmet, as the dissent correctly 
points out.3 
Defendant Devin Devon-Moore Lewis walked through an alley in 
Kalamazoo, Michigan with an acquaintance.4 A police officer, Nick Oliver, 
stopped him.5 Officer Oliver knew the acquaintance from prior interactions, so 
he focused on her initially, but quickly became suspicious of Lewis.6 Following 
this suspicion, he called for backup. Once backup arrived, Officer Oliver and 
another officer “physically restrained and searched Lewis.”7 Upon searching 
him, they found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm.8 As a result, he was 
charged with possession of a firearm as a felon, possession of a firearm in 
furtherance of drug trafficking, and possession of methamphetamine with intent 
to distribute.9 
Mr. Lewis filed a motion to suppress on Fourth Amendment grounds, 
arguing that the officer violated his rights against unreasonable search and 
seizure.10 The district court denied the motion, Lewis pled guilty, and was 
sentenced to 135 months imprisonment.11 Lewis appealed the case to the Sixth 
Circuit to challenge the denial of the motion to suppress.12 The decision to 
affirm was based on the belief that Officer Oliver had “reasonable suspicion to 
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conduct a Terry stop and search Lewis for weapons by the time that Lewis was 
seized.”13 
A Terry stop is justified if, at the time of seizure, the officer has reasonable 
suspicion to believe a person is armed and dangerous and is engaging in criminal 
activity.14 To satisfy this reasonable suspicion requirement, Officer Oliver 
claimed that he knew that the public alley that Lewis and his acquaintance were 
walking through was “commonly used to evade police detection and trespass on 
neighboring properties.”15 Once Oliver approached the two individuals, he 
quickly recognized the acquaintance, Amber French, who he knew to have sold 
drugs and stolen items from houses and trashcans in the past.16 Lewis had his 
hand in his pocket and Officer Oliver claimed he did not know if Lewis was 
armed.17 In response to this, he asked Lewis to remove his hand from his pocket. 
As he did this, Lewis “patted his waistband, which Oliver took as an indication 
that Lewis might be carrying a weapon.”18 Oliver also noticed that Lewis 
brushed something small and white behind his ear to the ground.19 Additionally, 
Oliver noted that Lewis was standing in a stance known as “bladed” which is 
common for people who are carrying guns.20 On top of this, he noticed an 
“abnormally large bulge” around his hip, which Officer Oliver believed to be a 
firearm.21 It was at this point that Oliver radioed in for backup.22 As the backup 
patrol car was approaching, Officer Oliver asked Lewis if he had any weapons 
on him and if he could search him—Lewis answered in the negative to both 
questions.23 The backup car, driven by Officer Day, then pulled up, blocking 
“what had been an unobstructed path down the other end of the alley.”24 Asked 
again if he was armed, Lewis put his hands up.25 He even complied when asked 
to take off his backpack.26 The two officers then proceeded to each grab Lewis’s 
wrists, in which Lewis responded by trying to break free of the officers’ hold 
and according to Oliver, attempted to punch him.27 Once this happened, they 
pinned Lewis to a fence, waited for more officers to arrive, handcuffed him, and 
searched him.28 It was at this point that they discovered the illegal items. 
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Did Officer Oliver seize Lewis? Oliver drove into the alley, directed his 
headlights and flashlight towards Lewis and his acquaintance, and parked his 
car parallel to the alleyway only several feet away from Lewis.29 Oliver drove 
a marked police cruiser and wore a police uniform with an undrawn pistol.30 
The district court determined that Lewis was considered “seized” when Officer 
Day arrived and partially blocked the exit of the alley, and again when Officer 
Oliver stepped closer to Lewis while using a commanding tone.31 Lewis was 
clearly seized, but the court found this justifiable on the merit that Officer Oliver 
had established reasonable suspicion that Lewis was engaging or had recently 
engaged in criminal activity.32 This was all based on the fact that “Lewis was in 
a high-crime area in an alley where people regularly trespassed, was with a 
known drug user and petty thief, and had exhibited behaviors characteristic of 
someone discarding contraband and of someone carrying a weapon.”33 The 
district court found that this gave Oliver reasonable suspicion that Lewis had a 
firearm on him which therefore justified the frisk of Lewis.34 
Was this a correct ruling based on Fourth Amendment law? The Fourth 
Amendment protects “The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”35 As this 
case points out, in certain circumstances, officers can stop and interrogate 
suspects even when there is no probable cause without violating the Fourth 
Amendment.36 This requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before an 
officer is able to stop, seize, and frisk someone.37 But this doesn’t work 
retroactively—they can’t stop and interrogate without reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause in hopes they will then gain reasonable suspicion during the 
encounter.38 
In United States v. Mendenhall, a person is considered seized by police 
when “by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of 
movement is restrained” such that “in view of all of the circumstances 
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
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not free to leave.”39 The Lewis dissent points out that the real moment of seizure 
was when Officer Oliver pulled up right in front of Lewis and specifically asked 
Lewis to take his hands out of his pocket, which he complied with.40 Given the 
circumstances of a police car pulling up right in front of someone, beaming their 
headlights on them, and a uniformed and armed officer asking to speak with 
them, a reasonable person in that same situation would clearly not think they 
were free to walk away.41 A reasonable person in the same situation would have 
felt like they also needed to comply with the officer’s requests to speak and take 
their hands out of their pocket.42 Lewis clearly yielded to authority.43 Although 
the police car did not completely block the exit, this did not signal Lewis could 
leave. 44 It was still somewhat obstructing the exit, it was strategically pulled up 
right next to Lewis, and its headlights were directed toward him.45 The majority 
thinks that seizure happened later when Officer Oliver ran the warrant check on 
his name.46 But this was after all the preceding events that would make a 
reasonable person think they were seized. 
At the time that the dissent correctly points to as time of seizure, what 
reasonable suspicion did the officer really have? They claim that because these 
two people were in an area known as a “high crime area,” that it gives police the 
right to stop them. But there had not been any trespass or any criminal activity 
reported at the time.47 Wardlow tells us that a person’s “presence in a ‘high 
crime area,’ standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized 
suspicion of criminal activity.”48 Simply stating that this happened in a “high 
crime area” is not enough for reasonable suspicion—more is needed. Terry tells 
us that a limited frisk may be conducted if the officer has reasonable suspicion 
to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous.49 To have this suspicion, 
more than a “mere hunch” is required—but they can “make inferences from the 
information available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’”50 
All Officer Oliver observed at the time of seizure was that there were two people 
walking in an alley way late at night.51 That’s it. There had been no incident 
reported that could potentially been tied to them. 
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This case is troubling in its finding of what constituted reasonable suspicion. 
It essentially is giving police carte blanche discretion to stop people based on 
where they are walking. This case is difficult to look at, because here the police 
did end up finding weapons and drugs on Lewis, but it cannot be overlooked 
that the stop was nonetheless a violation. Given the context of this case and its 
outcome, it “raises special concerns of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic 
profiling.”52 There was no basis to finding criminal activity other than the literal 
placement of pavement that Lewis and French were standing on. Location of 
one’s feet on pavement should not give the police a right to invade your privacy 
and violate your constitutional rights. 
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